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for fire as a landscape-scale force of nature. HFRA has encouraged landowners to build their homes in harm's way, encouraged communities to invest in more wildland sprawl, and increased the risks firefighters must face in trying to contain wildfire. In this article, I make the case for the repeal-or at the very least the substantial overhaul-of HFRA. I make this case reluctantly, though, because HFRA was enacted in full view of its likely consequences. Few surprises have arisen from its implementation and the agencies administering it have behaved just as they did before the law. So the real question is why this statute was enacted at all. Saying who it benefited and how they could secure legislation with such extreme social costs is how our social sciences (and most legal commentators) normally attack such a puzzle. 4 The problem with that approach here is that there really is no public enemy who connived HFRA into existenceunless one counts abstractions like 'private property' or 'local control.' It was the product of our Congress and Presidency, pure and simple. The dominant accounts of "collective action failures" like HFRA falter when concentrated stakeholders, power elites, iron triangles, Prisoners' dilemmas, and the like are all negligible-tononexistent. 5 This may say more about the state of our social sciences than it does about HFRA, 6 but HFRA has something to teach us about the state of our public lands law and, in particular, about the evolutionary juncture Congress and its agencies have reached in this age of ecology. Unfortunately, those lessons are no cause for celebration.
HFRA was a statutory scalpel. Its cuts were deep and, unfortunately, probably representative of what we should expect from federal conservation law into the foreseeable future. Part I gives a brief overview of public lands law and its history of fire suppression in the United States. Parts II and III describe and situate HFRA within that context as a statute of seemingly modest aims which is shaping up to be extremely problematic. Finally, Part IV argues that HFRA can teach us a great deal about public lands law more generally. Those lessons fall into three categories. First, Americans are divided over what constitutes good land use and a healthy landscape and we do not often heed the expert advice we get on land use when that advice is (characteristically) inconvenient and controvertible. Second, but related to the first, we lack a healthy culture of political argument for resolving our land use disputes, a deficit that is exacerbated enormously at the federal level. Lastly, administrative agencies like the Forest 7 HFRA was expressly confined in scope to those lands administered by either the Forest Service or the BLM. See 16 U.S.C. § 6502(1). Of course, the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service and others also have their fire problems in what we now know as the "wildland/urban interface." See infra Part III . 8 Service, Park Service, Biological Survey, and others well before the long-term consequences of fire suppression were fully appreciated. By the 1920s, every fire was viewed as a management failure, something to diagnose and prevent. 11 As the agencies became more expert at suppressing fire, the resources they committed to the enterprise grew, improving their effectiveness in the eyes of the public and in the eyes of Congress.
Little did they know, though, that they were stepping onto a treadmill. Eradicating fire from a fire-adapted ecosystem is a temporary achievement at best and, the longer it is absent, the more likely it will return with a vengeance. Fuels are always building in such a system and either they burn periodically or they keep building-presumably to a breaking point of some kind. 12 Our landscapes were altered profoundly in the effort to eradicate the ineradicable, often to differing results depending on local conditions. 13 Some forest types like Southwest ponderosa pine (adapted to frequent, low-intensity surface fires) are amenable to a range of fire suppression tactics. But they are also likely to change significantly as a result of suppression.
14 Overall, the release of species that become uncontrolled, landscape-scale agents of change across our forests, prairies, and deserts is writing another, related chapter. 15 And climate change, of course, is complicating both trends.
Foresters and other land managers came to these realizations years ago, but the general policy of total fire eradication remained in place out of fear that "any admission of a positive role for fire would be confusing; the message that fire was sometimes good and sometimes bad was considered too sophisticated for the AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND TREATMENT STRATEGY] . 13 Severe, stand-replacing fires often result in profound habitat disturbance, uniquely disruptive changes to local human communities, watershed damage and surface water quality impacts, and other significant economic losses. See Michael P. Dombeck et al.,
Wildfire Policy and Public Lands: Integrating Scientific Understanding With Social Concerns Across Landscapes, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 883 (2004).
14 In some areas, the reintroduction of fire through prescribed burns has not restarted the natural regime very well, either. See Jon E. Keeley, Fire Management Impacts on Invasive Plants in the Western United States, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 375, 376-77 (2006) (describing invasions of cheat grass associated with prescribed burning). 15 See generally Keeley, supra note 14. The Sonoran desert, for example, is becoming an endangered ecosystem as buffelgrass (an African transplant brought by ranchers that now excludes native cacti and burns routinely) takes it over. See Michelle Nijhuis, Bonfire of the Superweeds, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS Aug. 20, 2007. general public." 16 As early as the 1960s and as a rule by the 1970s, most professionals knew that the policy of wide scale fire suppression had been a serious mistake. 17 Correcting the mistake was something else entirely, though. Reintroducing fire into disturbed systems was not only an unpredictable proposition; because of the stakes, it was a potentially catastrophic one. 18 
B. Process, Planning, and Paralysis
At the same time professional resource managers were accepting the fact that fire suppression had been a monumental mistake, the National Forest System (NFS), National Park System (NPS), and the BLM's lands were being cemented within a series of "organic" management laws. The NFS alone grew from the relatively modest aims of "securing favorable conditions of water flows, and. . . furnish[ing] a continuous supply of timber,"
19 to a 192 million acre, 155 unit aggregate being managed for "the long-term benefit for present and future generations." 20 That gradual process of legislative accretion is often overshadowed by its milestones. Looking back on the full sweep of the twentieth century, though, two kinds of legislative prescriptions stand out as constants through the ups and downs. First, Congress repeatedly directed land managers to balance disparate land uses to the best of their abilities and to protect as many uses as they could, place by place. 21 Second, Congress consistently relied on administrative procedures to resolve or dissolve pitched conflicts over management choices. 22 Eventually, these two types of legislative mandates 23 Unable to marshal the expertise needed for all the treacherous balancing and lacking real guidance on what-besides everyone's exhaustion-all the procedures were really for, the agencies too often found a lowest common denominator of (1) zoning different land uses into discrete districts, (2) trimming and/or avoiding established procedures whenever possible, while (3) underinvesting in monitoring, benchmarking, and organizational reform.
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The Bush Administration, of course, aimed to upset this equilibrium. HFRA was its first-and, as it turns out, also its last-legislative salvo in that assault.
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(The courts have yet fully to decide the fate of all its administrative maneuvers. 26 ) Convinced that too much was being spent on appeals and process, determined to continue extractive uses like logging and drilling, 27 and bolstered in 2002 with a Republican majority in both houses of Congress, the Administration pushed hard on its plans to overhaul public lands law. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was its primary target. NEPA practice has long weathered serious critique from many quarters. 28 Perhaps the most powerful critique, though, is the 29 Its requirement that our agencies conduct analyses of choices and try to forecast possible futures arguably makes us "paper-rich but information-poor." 30 Indeed, the "NEPA process"-wherein planning and project-level decisions both involve mandatory environmental reviewsconstituted much of the Forest Service's "process predicament."
31 Mandating forecasts where little is known is usually a waste of time and energy. It is probably no exaggeration to say that NEPA's notorious prediction burden is both much of what aligns public land managers (and the Bush Administration) against this icon of conservation, and what makes it such a flawed vehicle for ecological restoration. Our agencies possess many forms of expertise. But even expert predictions must be discounted heavily when complex systems are at issue. Predicting the behavior of ecosystems where fire has been suppressed demonstrates the point unequivocally.
32
Thus, HFRA's boldest 'reform' may have been its abbreviation of NEPA's analytical requirements with respect to "hazardous fuel reduction projects" (HFRPs), something the Administration had sought even before legislative authorization was given. Likely its biggest impact, though, will be something less tangible. HFRA is helping change how our land management agencies view themselves and their roles as keepers of public land. As in other fields, the analytical burdens of planning land uses without hard data have steered managers into relying more and more on modeling. Facing a universe of possibilities across vast territories, models generated on limited information are attractive to agencies that cannot actually achieve "comprehensive rationality." 34 This is rather alarming to many given the tendency of model-based predictions to fail and fail miserably. 35 Legal change is overwhelmingly a legislative phenomenon today. But our legislatures are becoming contrived, even deceptive environments. Our society's ambivalence about most appeals to virtue, combined with our utter failure to nurture a political discourse that is at once both sincere and able to handle truly divisive issues like sprawl, are creating real troubles for our democracy. These troubles are eased very little by the injection of expertise or expert advice.
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HFRA is as good a case study as any. Section A traces the path HFRA took to enactment and what it demonstrates about lawmaking on issues like land use and natural resources today, issues that are both complex and morally charged. Section B locates this case study of HFRA in a larger context of our changing conceptions of legal authority and moral diversity as we seek to implement an ecologically restorative agenda. 39 See GAO REPORT TO (articulating an ideal of "public reason" in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism and equal concern and respect for persons that does not require any public justification to rest on premises someone could reasonably reject).
A. Deliberate Abstraction: 'Restoration' in Reality
Legislation today is more often powered by pragmatism than it is by democratic will. HFRA was enacted in late 2003 by a 2-1 margin in the House (286-140) and a 6-1 margin in the Senate (80-14). 41 But it was hardly the bipartisan sweep of reform that these margins might suggest. 42 Indeed, the margin may have been because 2003 was the high water mark of "Luntz-speak" in Washington 43 -where nothing is as it sounds-more than it was a moment of renewal for public lands law. This legislation, as Section B explains more fully, entwined the administrative and legislative processes in a way that, improbably, made them even more opaque and dysfunctional than normal. First, HFRA stamped congressional imprimatur on an administrative document, "A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the Environment," placing it and its subsequent revisions in the role of master plan for fire risk reduction. 44 That HFRA did so perhaps shows a legislature willing to defer to administrators and local people. But the content of this planor the lack thereof-inspires little confidence that Congress's deference was either informed or warranted. The Implementation Plan embodies an agreement to agree reached by an ad hoc "Wildland Fire Leadership Council" (WFLC). It does not record shared priorities among the signatories; the goals it mentions are vague and indeterminate. Indeed, this aspect of HFRA may be the next evolutionary step for legislation in the modern state: in and of itself, HFRA's investiture of authority in the Implementation Plan decided nothing, planned nothing, guided no one toward definite action and deputized an indeterminate, ad hoc entity to change it all at 41 42 Cf. Keiter, Law of Fire, supra note 9, at 344 ("Judging from HFRA's declared purposes, Congress perceives fire primarily as a political rather than ecological matter."). 43 See VAUGHN & CORTNER, supra note 1, at 12 (observing that U.S. environmental policy had gone from being inspired by Silent Spring to being sleazed by "Luntz-speak," named for Frank Luntz, a Republican political consultant famous for "reframing" issues by popularizing tendentious phrasings). Luntz's anemic version of political discourse is diagramed in FRANK LUNTZ, WORDS THAT WORK: IT'S NOT WHAT YOU SAY, IT'S WHAT PEOPLE HEAR (2007) . 44 HFRA requires that all authorized projects be consistent with the "Implementation Plan" (which it defines as including the will. 45 The most mature outgrowth of this set-up to date, a so-called "cohesive fuels treatment strategy," acknowledges that "[f]ires become more costly when homes are involved," but provides no guidance whatsoever to stakeholders or field personnel on where the WUI should stop and ecosystem "restoration" should begin. 46 Second, the centerpiece of the Act, the HFRP, is defined only by reference to the Implementation Plan's glossary entry on "appropriate tools."
47 "Fuel reduction" can be anything from pruning trees to prescribed burns to logging burned-over areas on the theory that their full restoration requires it. 48 The provable benefits of some of these projects are nil-and perhaps outweighed by their costs. 49 Not surprisingly, thus, the "collaboration" this Implementation Plan encourages-which HFRA enables notwithstanding the Federal Advisory Committee Act 50 -has already generated ill will and accusations of exclusionary motives. 51 What the Implementation Plan says is that the signatories all hope to "improve fire prevention and suppression," "reduce hazardous fuels," "restore fire adapted ecosystems," and "promote community assistance."
52 Where, when, and how they intend to meet these goals, however, remains a mystery. 53 Of course, 45 Many have argued that moves like this are the evolutionary perfection of contemporary legislation.
See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE (2005)
. 46 See FUELS TREATMENT STRATEGY, supra note 12, at B-8. But cf. id. "Urban and suburban community expansion into rural areas placed valuable human improvements across a landscape that now burns much more severely than historically." 47 16 U.S.C. § 6511(2) (2007) ("The term "authorized hazardous fuel reduction project" means the measures and methods described in the definition of "appropriate tools" contained in the glossary of the Implementation Plan . . . .").
48 This is a "theory" because post-fire regeneration by different tree species and forest types remains enshrouded in considerable doubts. See supra note 31. 49 A principal field of debate concerns the "salvage logging" project wherein a burned area is logged, ostensibly on the theory that restoration by mechanical planting and removal of dead or at-risk trees improves the regenerative prospects of the treated area. The science behind these predictions is nascent, though, and has caused conflagrations of its own. See, e.g., Erin Halcomb, Weathering the Academic Storm, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 28, 2007 (describing the storm over Oregon State Ph.D. student's fieldwork studying conifer regeneration after Oregon's Biscuit Fire and finding greater regeneration rates than was normally assumed which resulted in tremendous pressures from the logging industry, the Oregon legislature, and other stakeholders favoring "salvage" logging). 50 See 16 U.S.C. § 6513(b)(2) (2007). 51 See, e.g., Wildwest Inst. v. Bull, 472 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 2006) (allegations that HFRA project was selected through a "pattern and practice of selective inclusion and exclusion" of stakeholders by Forest Service).
52 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 44, at 9-19. 53 HFRA requires all its authorized projects to follow the Implementation Plan. See 16 U.S.C. § 6512(a) (2007) ("As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall implement authorized hazardous fuel reduction projects, consistent with the Implementation Plan"); id. at 6513(a) ("In accordance with the Implementation [Vol. 28 No. 2 pursuing such goals across a real landscape is the sort of challenge that the median voter in Congress was unlikely to confront willingly. 54 How to reduce fuels in the same place one is restoring fire-adapted ecosystems without either excluding people from that landscape or putting them in jeopardy remains deeply unclear even among experts. 55 And high profile failures like the Cerro Grande fire of 2000-a prescribed burn set by the National Park Service in hopes of restoring the fire regime on its land, which quickly escaped and burned into Los Alamos, New Mexico 56 -dominate people, cognitively.
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This all goes beyond legislative (or administrative) reactions to bounded rationality. Restoration that entails real risks has precious few advocates. But do the shortcomings of our legislated steps toward ecosystem restoration diminish them in some way? Conceivably, their authority is diminished. 58 Basic questions like this are hardly ever asked, though. So what is the practical authority of a law like HFRA and the agencies implementing it? One could argue that, next to the public lands statutes of the past, HFRA pales by comparison. 59 This might not be so much of a surprise: "restoration" of damaged ecosystems is an agenda with no beginning, no end, few champions, and mixed moral implications. 60 When we Plan, the Secretary shall develop an annual program of work for Federal land that gives priority to [projects] that provide for the protection of at-risk communities or watersheds or that implement community wildfire protection plans."). But the plan itself is a loosely structured framework that mentions "performance measures" and measurable goals without actually setting any. It instead touts a "three tiered organizational structure [that] facilitates collaboration among governments and stakeholders at the local, state, regional and national levels." IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 44, at 5. 54 Legislators familiar with these issues and the trade-offs they entail would be the consummate specialists on any account. How and why nonspecialists vote for bills like HFRA, however, has divided political scientists profoundly. 59 See, e.g., Keiter, Law of Fire supra note 9, at 365-78. 60 Cf. JULIANNE LUTZ NEWTON, ALDO LEOPOLD'S ODYSSEY (2006) (tracing this reality throughout the thought of one of the twentieth century's principal environmental philosophers, Aldo Leopold).
speak of environmental restoration, we do so without any meaningful consensus on its purpose or point. 61 Indeed, citizens divide sharply over any environmental philosophy of restoration, usually choosing instead to worship the opposing symbols of "preservation" or "conservation."
62 A federal statute purporting to restore "healthy forests" on our public lands would have to reinvent our public lands law and public lands agencies-indeed, reinvent civil society's whole vocabulary enveloping them. 63 Such restoration would aim to correct centuries of mistakes and abuse. To do so, it would have to imagine a new institutional architecture that would allow landscape-scale processes like fire to operate on, and possibly reorder, highly fragmented and heavily disturbed landscapes. HFRA, of course, did nothing of the sort. It contorted legislative and administrative authority into a noxious mixture that only our federalism, pinned beneath the shibboleths of "private property" and "local control," could have generated.
B. A Healthy Forests 'Initiative' Into the Healthy Forests Restoration Act
The last three presidents have learned hard lessons about wildfire. In their administrations, the Forest Service and the Interior Department have confronted devastating fire seasons in which human lives have been lost while billions were spent trying to forestall the worst. In the fall of 2000, the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture presented a report to President Clinton calling for a ten year, $10 billion "National Fire Plan" to cope with the looming crisis of wildland fire. 64 These moves all framed the legislation that would become HFRA. Bush's "Healthy Forests Initiative" was announced at the height of the fire season in 2002 and directed "the Departments of Agriculture and Interior and the Council on Environmental Quality to improve regulatory processes to ensure more timely decisions, greater efficiency, and better results in reducing the risks of catastrophic wildfires by restoring forest health." 69 This would soon form the core of HFRA: fund fuel reduction projects on public and private lands in areas having the highest potential for catastrophic wildfire and fast track those projects through otherwise applicable legal procedures. 70 The agencies themselves played perhaps the biggest role in publicizing the risks of wildfire and the need for fast track authority. 71 There are plenty of reasons to question these "reforms."
72 Lest it be seen as precipitous, HFRA included a cap on the acreage that could be treated with authorized HFRPs (20 million acres) 73 and prohibited HFRPs from wilderness areas and wilderness study areas. 74 The much more daunting prospect, though, is that HFRA solidified a situational strategy into its own feedback loop around wildfire and sprawl. HFRA directed the Forest Service and BLM to target at least half of their wildfire work into the WUI 75 and, within the WUI, to give priority to those communities having "Community Wildfire Protection Plans" (CWPPs). 75 Part III lays out the legal geography of the WUI. The Forest Service has been averaging about 70% of the appropriations for HFRPs to the BLM's 30%, see GAO Report, supra note 39, and has averaged much more than half of its work in the WUI. 76 See 16 U.S.C. § 6513(d).
their local wildfire risks. 77 Yet HFRA's only firm requirements of CWPPs is that they be developed "within the context of the collaborative agreements and the guidance of" the WFLC and be "agreed to by the applicable local government, local fire department, and state agency responsible for forest management." 78 The plans need not have any particular content. HFRA does not require that the plans discourage development in fire prone areas, that they protect local watersheds before enabling more development-nor, indeed, that they strike any balance at all among competing priorities. And, for many, the federal money cannot flow fast enough, leading to shorter and shorter turnarounds on CWPPs and other HFRA deliverables. 79 How CWPPs relate to local land use planning already in place is but another unanswered question.
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Still worse is the fact that neither the Forest Service nor BLM seem much interested in the CWPPs, whether as substance or process. Last year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that while 95% of the agencies' administrative units had completed their own first generation fire plans, neither agency required the plans be updated with new data or that they be linked in any way to the CWPPs in their region.
81 This is a stunning failure of management The CWPP is further defined as a plan that "identifies and prioritizes areas for hazardous fuel reduction treatments and recommends the types and methods of treatment on Federal and non-Federal land that will protect 1 or more atrisk communities and essential infrastructure" and "recommends measures to reduce structural ignitability throughout the at-risk community." Id. at § 6511(3)(B)-(C). Nothing in HFRA or WFLC guidance requires a particular scope or completeness for plans-or any other qualitative or performance criteria for a CWPP whatsoever. 79 HFRA makes no provision for tying CWPPs into such planning, though. 81 See GAO Testimony, supra note 39, at 6.
given how pronounced the connections are between dispersed development and ultra-expensive wildfire incidents. 82 Indeed, if the government is collecting or monitoring any data at all on the content of CWPPs, their performance, their improvement, etc., it is not saying. 83 Are the projects and planning of CWPPs actually reducing the wildfire risks within their communities? Are the projects that are being funded contributing in any way to the overall restoration of affected landscapes? We are all left to wonder.
In my view, this is a Potemkin village version of land planning and it illustrates how ill suited federal agencies are to do the real work that could, at least in principle, pursue all four of the Implementation Plan's goals. That work is, of course, coordinated land use planning at multiple scales. It would be one thing if HFRA's admixture of legislative and administrative mechanisms were the necessary result of public officials representing their constituents' best interests. Broad scale legislation is a remarkable achievement and Congress's approval ratings are, of course, nearing historic lows. And borrowing experts' credibility and visibility while deferring to local actors who are attacking the problem at smaller scales is hardly a bad thing.
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Beneath the superficial appearances, though, HFRA raises suspicion after suspicion-which, unfortunately, may be all we have. Deliberate abstractions have been the norm in broad scale legislation for decades. Most forms of "command and control" regulation by agencies are even more unpopular than contemporary NEPA practice. 85 Yet social scientists remain split methodologically in explaining the human behaviors that frame these realities. The prevailing paradigm, known as "public choice" or "positive political theory," presumes public officials maximize their own welfare, not that of their constituents.
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Most of that work, though, has generated few (if any) useful predictions-or even propositions that are both true and nontrivial. 85 There are important exceptions. Then-judge Breyer's call for "a small, centralized administrative group, charged with a rationalizing mission" and having "interagency jurisdiction," "political insulation" and the authority to "impose its decisions," was issued only fifteen years ago. The agencies reprint the admonition in many of their administrative documents. Who it actually guides or binds is yet another mystery.
As individuals, more and more of us want to live near and among what is left of the "wild" even while society as a whole absorbs the social costs this freedom is generating. That all ends in a massive paradox: our expert agencies, to which our elected representatives keep deferring and keep delegating power, are incapable of saving us from ourselves in matters as complex and morally ambiguous as sprawl and public lands. Part III locates these failures within the geography of wildland fire-a geography of semi-built landscapes, diluted rationalism, and deference to "local control." 88 
III. THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE WILDLAND/URBAN INTERFACE
This Part fills out the legal geography of the wildland/urban interface, a category of space in America that is immense and growing. Section A details HFRA's different criteria demarcating the WUI, principally as that area attracting the most managerial attention to wildland fire, while Section B compares this whole dynamic to another, earlier example: federal flood control policy. Finally, Section C shows how this area's immensity will further undermine our faith in expertise as some sort of solution to the challenges of governing public lands.
A. The Geography of 'Wildlands'
The "wildland-urban interface" (WUI) may sound like a boundary, something similar to the nature/culture divide. But it is actually the fastest growing category of real estate in America. This is in part because the legal definition of the WUI is broad and indeterminate. 92 The most concrete component of the definition is a gargantuan list of virtually every incorporated municipality bordering public lands. 93 But it expands from there to include any bordering areas having "[three] or more structures per acre, with shared municipal services," 94 and any area "within or adjacent to" one of these places that is identified in a CWPP can be WUI. 95 Where "adjacency" ends, not surprisingly, is quickly becoming the subject of exurban legend. Five miles? Fifteen miles? More? 96 The statutory definition, however, also includes "intermix communities": any 92 HFRA defines the WUI as "an area within or adjacent to an at-risk community," 16 U.S.C. § 6511(16) (2003), and then defines "at risk communities" as an "interface community as defined in the notice entitled 'Wildland Urban Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That Are at High Risk From Wildfire' issued by the Secretary of the Interior . . . or . . . a group of homes and other structures with basic infrastructure and services (such as utilities and collectively maintained transportation routes) within or adjacent to Federal land . . . in which conditions are conducive to a largescale wildland fire disturbance event" and "for which a significant threat to human life or property exists as a result of a wildland fire disturbance event." Id. at § 6511(1) (2003) (emphasis added). This makes the WUI a function of two kinds of "at risk" communities: the "interface" and the "intermix" areas surrounding public lands. 93 The published list consists of over 11,000 communities, twenty- Nice questions of degree could easily bog this definition down in many parts of the West, but rationally determinate boundaries were not the point: everyone is erring on the side of inclusion.
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The combined scope of this WUI is, however interpreted, extraordinarily broad. Potent "market" forces promise to keep it growing too. There is a commonly expressed preference for residences proximate to landscapes which look and feel like nature in a "wild" state. 99 In the only spatially explicit analysis done to date on the WUI, Volcker Radeloff and colleagues estimated that the density definition of WUI characterizes some 9% of the surface area of the 48 contiguous states: over 44 million homes (or about 39% of all the housing units in America) are in the WUI. 100 It is still proximity to public lands that remains most striking about the WUI, though. Over 8 million homes were built within 30 miles of a national forest from 1982-97. 101 If such encroachment is increasingly the norm on all public lands systems, though, fire is its foil.
By the 1970s, fire was occurring on a tenth of the acreage annually that it had been in the 1930s. 102 Just as the interior West was booming and recreation and scenery were becoming the dominant economic uses of public lands, fire seemed a distant threat. 103 The combination of human migration toward forests where fire-
16 U.S.C. § 6511(1)(A)(ii) (2003)
. HFRA also references the notice's definition of "interface community," not the list. Thus, communities may be added to the list if they meet the definition, i.e., they create "a clear line of demarcation between residential, business, and public structures and wildland fuels. Wildland fuels do not generally continue into the developed area. The development density for an interface community is usually three or more structures per acre, with shared municipal services." Id. at 753. 98 Cf. WILMER & APLET, supra note 96, at 3-6 (arguing that the alternative density thresholds in the Federal Register definitions of "intermix" communities represent vastly different approaches to controlling wildfire risks). 99 Even putting aside the cultish fascination with wilderness in America, see Jamison E. Colburn, Habitat and Humanity, supra note 24, at 150, see also Keiter, supra note 25, many millions of Americans now routinely visit wild areas for their occasional recreation, leisure, and study. See Laitos & Carr, supra note 27 at 161. A "significant portion of new development occurs at low and medium density and . . . housing growth is particularly high in areas that are rich in natural amenities." V.C. Radeloff intolerant species were flourishing which rendered the forests more susceptible to insects and disease, which then created large stands and downed piles of fuels that further dried out in long stretches of drought, all led to the break point we find ourselves at today: extreme fire risks 104 and growing vulnerabilities. 105 Totally obscured from view is how "healthy forests" actually function. Assuming we are serious about "restoration," where do we look for our reference landscape within this pervasive pattern of disturbance?
B. Floods and Fires: Our Land Use Planning Federalism
At least one parallel is worth drawing. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) predates HFI/HFRA by decades. But HFRA is remarkably similar to the NFIP in many respects. "Since the NFIP has been in effect, the regime has arguably enhanced vulnerabilities to flood losses rather than reduced the outcome risk." Ironically, by conveying a sense of security and federal approval, the NFIP has probably increased our vulnerability to floods in the U.S. by normalizing and thereby enabling flood plain development-which has risen steadily every year since 1968. 108 Another failure is that quantitative estimates of risk are usually based upon a "finite record of past events . . . [and] the assumption of climate stationarity that necessarily underlies the notion of a '100-year' flood." Chivers & Flores, supra note 106, at 806. 109 The costs of HFRPs vary significantly. They rise from a low of less than $125 per hectare to a high of $2500. Donovan & Brown, supra note 8, at 76. The overall estimates for HFRPs that most communities seek-the so-called "mechanical" treatments of pruning and removing woody biomass-are daunting.
acres of WUI are treated once, it will almost certainly be time to go back to square one and repeat the process. That is simply no way to serve any broader, systemcorrecting function.
In its defense, the Forest Service has been creating a database to share local plans, documents, and other outputs 110 and it is working diligently on its LANDFIRE database and mapping system in an effort to identify and prioritize high-risk areas. 111 Third parties who have assessed the LANDFIRE investment, however, remain skeptical. 112 Geospatial data of this kind, especially on fuel conditions (which can vary significantly depending on microclimates), is extremely costly to gather, manage, integrate, and share. Some of those costs may drop with improvements in technology like satellite imagery and various networking solutions but, if so, the agencies are not letting on.
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So we probably cannot say with any meaningful degree of certainty what the core of HFRA is accomplishing. The statute certainly reflects a reluctance to dictate land development patterns, whether the federal government has the constitutional authority to do so or not. . Hann and Bunnell, both Forest Service researchers, predicted (based on their modeling) that multi-scalar planning could reduce the acreage treatments needed to keep pace with fuels, but that even an "integrated" scenario suggested treating between 3.7 and 4.9 million acres per year just to stay ahead of fuel buildups on National Forest System lands alone. Id. at 400. That is well in excess of current acreage rates. 112 See OIG Report, supra note 39, at 6-8; GAO 115 Now this is not to say that the agencies are collecting no data about HFRA. But the data they are collecting are cause for more alarm. A team of Forest Service-funded researchers in Minnesota, for example, studied how HFRA/HFI was being covered in the press. 116 The Forest Service is also studying ways of reducing home ignitability when fires do reach the WUI. Not surprisingly, their findings confirm that the "key to reducing WUI home fire losses is to reduce home ignitability." 117 Modeling, combined with a few case studies, tended to show that "a home's structural characteristics [nonflammable roof] and its immediate surroundings determine [its] ignition potential in a WUI fire." To ensure a house will not ignite given the intensity of some crown fires prevalent lately, a buffer zone of up to forty meters around the home and all its structures is often recommended.
118 That will certainly increase the disturbance footprint of wildland development, but its overall utility as risk reduction is far more ambiguous. 119 Finally, the agencies are diligently tracking the number of acres being "treated" with HFRPs.
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How communities respond to fuels and plan for wildfire with their CWPPs is, or at least can be, a critical moment for a community. Because of our federalism, it is inherently situational and inherently indexed to local conditions. States assert varying degrees of control over their local governments, both by distributing powers and by interceding in federal/local partnerships, making this type of "collaboration" complex and inherently provisional.
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Given the federal government's appropriations on wildfire, its legal authority under HFRA and other federal statutes, and its landscape-scale perspective, the creation of CWPPs could be, if the federal government managed it properly, a series of "information forcing" events.
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CWPPs done well could be held up as exemplars, as benchmarks for other communities with similar values to meet or exceed. Mandatory monitoring of actions implemented under CWPPs could gather real data about a project's value because it would collect information about whole experiences from plan to action.
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None of this is being carried out today, though.
C. The Practical Authority of the Forest Service, BLM, and HFRA
The foregoing discussion points to a very different kind of question. What is natural resources legislation for today? What function does it serve? A long time ago it stopped being the source of people's legal rights and duties on and around public lands. It shifted to being a blueprint the agencies were to follow in specifying such rights and duties by rules and regulations. But it has morphed again and is hardly even that much any longer. HFRA demonstrates this further evolutionary step. One must find the legislative history of a long-gone appropriations bill to locate any direction at all from Congress to the agencies on how to prioritize fuels treatment projects and with whom the agencies should work in doing so. 124 The leading casebook on federal public lands champions the rise of "organic legislation" as having "thoroughly overhauled . . . all four (park, refuge, forest, and BLM) major land systems."
125 But this kind of legislation seems like a prologue today. It seems increasingly unlikely and antiquated when conservation has become just another political football. Legislation remains with us, though, even as its functional role is shifting so dramatically. Its "dignity" hangs on:
the dignity of legislation, the ground of its authority, and its claim to be respected by us, have a lot to do with the sort of achievement it is. Our respect for legislation is in part the tribute we should pay to the achievement of concerted, cooperative, coordinated or collective action in the circumstances of modern life.
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As an achievement, federal conservation legislation is becoming cost prohibitive except in the realm of political opportunism (from which HFRA seems to have emerged). If it is true that you manage what you measure, the agencies' collection of the data they are gathering about HFRA/HFI is worrisome. Bean counters love "progress" like millions of acres treated, but landscapes are far more unique and unpredictable than such measurements allow. No matter what a [Vol. 28 No. 2 project entails, its restorative potential is necessarily limited, perhaps even temporary (appropriations might not grow on trees, but fuels do). Thus, without the restoration of historic fire regimes-something that will not happen in the WUI absent huge investments in the hard work of prescribed burning and a lot of political leadership-so-called fuel reduction is a second-best strategy at most.
Federal efforts to encourage landowners and communities to reduce structural ignitability probably increase the disturbance footprint of our sprawl, but do they really address our basic problem? Our basic problem is that our WUI keeps expanding-as homes are being built throughout our (comparatively) natural areas. Our basic problem is not even being confronted by HFRA and, in fact, it is probably worsening the problem. The problem is deliberative. Why do we refuse to recognize that deeply contentious, emotional issues like good land use are not being resolved at the scale to which our nation has grown? We keep legislating federal jurisdiction into existence only to starve our federal authorities of the resources they need to actually use that jurisdiction and achieve our common ends. I offer three conjectural answers to these questions about ecological restoration in the regulatory state.
First, agencies are never forthcoming about how little they can achieve in the real world. Real expertise would make agency managers admit-broadcast-their own fallibility and few agency actors have any incentive to do that. 127 Fire suppression in the twentieth century was the experts' idea originally. The problem is that broadcasting fallibility is usually not much of a career path, whether in the public or the private sector. 128 Second, in the context of wildfire where the threat and most imaginable solutions operate at landscape scales, the differentiation of land systems and bureaus and use zones is clearly blocking real progress. This is emblematic of public lands management more generally. 129 The problem space is so large that the information costs of any operational decision, to say nothing of the stakes, are necessarily immense. The institutional divides simply compound our costs exponentially. The structure of the WFLC decisionmaking process is summitlike, with superpowers who meet at neutral locations first to legislate a neutral vocabulary, then later to establish a decisionmaking procedure, and only finally after that to engage the issues-usually with theatrics and vague allusions to consensus that can never be "imprisoned" in specific terms. Real coordination at these scales on issues engendering deep disagreement is simply too complex, too likely to end in frustration. It is worth noting, by contrast, that working hybrids like "business improvement districts" have proliferated at an astounding rate in local governments across the country-notwithstanding truly divisive legal issues 127 See generally BREYER supra note 85. 128 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 543, 554-74 (2000) (noting the proliferation of public/private hybrids where firms and agencies take actions that are mutually reinforcing but still not fully cooperative given the incentives each has to avoid revealing its own fallibility). 129 See Colburn, Habitat and Humanity, supra note 24.
that still simmer. 130 Of course, such experiments are much easier to plan, execute, and improve over time at small scales than they are at immense ones. 131 Finally, in what must be his most repeated prose, George Perkins Marsh observed long ago that "Man is a disturbing agent," and that wherever he sets his foot "the harmonies of nature are set to discords." 132 This was a deeply misanthropic view of our predicament. Could Marsh have meant that only landscapes without people are truly healthy? If so, it shows how perverted our concept of "the wild" really is. Not only does it make conservation exceptional by nature. It draws people onto the (exceptional) landscapes worth protecting only to spoil them by making them ordinary. In this, wildness is its own pharmakon-a poison and therapy all in one. In a country of so many people with so much wealth, if "the wild" is where land is healthy, then that is where people of means will want to be. This is the WUI problem. We are spreading our civilization over this continent so quickly in good part because we do not like our built environments or the way people inhabit them.
Part IV argues that solving this problem will require us to reimagine landscape-scale forces like fire as elements of our land and that this must begin with the substantial overhaul (if not repeal) of HFRA. It cannot stop there, though, because we desperately need enhanced coordination of land uses in the face of so much uncertainty and risk. Part IV proposes targeted reforms that a new administration should work to impose on wildfire and sprawl in the hopes that, ultimately, more information and better sharing of that information will enable real deliberation among the citizen-owners of our landscapes.
IV. TOWARD A LAND USE PLANNING EXPERIMENTALISM?
So what is to be done? We are, it seems, moving gradually into an age in which our 'expert' natural resource agencies are receding in their influence. Increasingly, the truly hard and big questions that once were left to agency processes are being funneled back into courts, boardrooms, and elsewhere. Deliberate abstractions in legislation-for public lands law, phrases like "valid existing rights"-are being given determinate meanings by legal actors other than agencies. 133 The mass media, judges, and citizens are all increasingly skeptical of 130 public agencies-if not the whole notion of unbiased expertise. Yet, as Karen O'Neill argued in her history of flood control policy, complex, system-wide restorations will remain a practical impossibility so long as broad-scale cooperation throughout the natural system as a whole is missing for the obvious reason that too many parts of these natural systems have too long been deranged to suit our will. 134 We are long past the time in which tinkering will do. Of course, people are not normally inclined to think about whole natural systems. Our present economy certainly gives them little reason to do so. So what we need are comparable alternatives to the rational centralizing agency and its top-down conceptualization of landscapes in mental-geographic space. And that is a tall order. Part IV begins from the present and works forward into that uncertain future. Section A charts a bottom-up model of integrating large and small scale land planning while Section B argues that critical reforms at the top are vital as well. Finally, Section C briefly considers whether land use planning that presumes mistake and surprise is reconcilable with the rule of law.
A. Avoiding the Tragedies of Centralization
HFRA gets the multiscalar nature of land planning half right. It incentivizes local planning without mandating it, connects local plans loosely to a broader planning process, and makes the broader process innately flexible (at least as a matter of law). 135 But by leaving specific measures in CWPPs entirely to local location, etc. But those legal issues, once viewed as a matter for the land management agencies to sort out, see, e.g., id. at 1087 ("The administrative interpretation need only be a reasonable one to be accepted, even though there may be another equally reasonable interpretation."), are now being shifted back into the courts, if ever-so gradually. (2006) . "Because the health of each reach of a river depends on conditions throughout the river system, restoration projects done in isolation often fail. In a federal system, the central government could be mobilized to coordinate action across localities. Progressives and New Dealers had aimed to do this . . . [but] largely failed." Id. at 185. 135 To be clear, reforming the WFLC process to make it more adaptive and deliberative as a practical matter is not something accomplishable by legal means alone. But a real step toward that end would be forcing the WFLC to communicate its interpretations of restoration, at least in principle, more often and more clearly than it is doing at present. Conceivably, more public discussion of restoration's point and purpose would force far more productive deliberations among the different constituencies represented and could, as a result, lead to a more textured account of what any central authority can or should be doing to control the risks of wildfire while allowing fire back on to the landscape. Cf. Cohen, supra note 89, at 85 ("At the heart of the institutionalization of the deliberative procedure is the existence of arenas in which discretion and not requiring that the CWPPs themselves be centrally recorded or widely shared, HFRA misses a rare opportunity to infuse the fruits of directly deliberative local politics into the technocratic abyss that agencies like the Forest Service are becoming. 136 Real people confronting trade-offs in their own backyards must imagine and choose practicable solutions to present problems. 137 That kind of problem solving, nested as it is within whole experiences, is a unique resource that can be of extraordinary value to subsequent actors. 138 HFRA, in short, missed one of the most powerful insights in decades into how public policy can actually shift behavior and markets over time: the use of targeted, mandatory disclosures.
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Counties and municipalities possess the lion's share of land use planning authority in the United States. Structurally, though, they are competitors with one another. 140 To be sure, federal agencies are rightly wary of planning or regulating land uses on private land, if only because of the politics involved. 141 If there is a role localities and states have shown little interest in playing, however, it is the citizens can propose issues for the political agenda and participate in debate about those issues."). 136 See generally Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313 (1997) (describing the challenges of joining these two kinds of institutions into workable hybrids).
137 This is qualitatively different from a federal employee who does so after having taken "comments" or published Federal Register notices. The trappings of office too often separate officials from the communities of which they would otherwise be a part. See ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY (1970) . 138 See, e.g., CWPP STATUS REPORT, supra note 79, at 4 ("Many who have been involved in CWPP development are quick to note that in many cases the process is itself a success. Collaboration among local landowners, local governments, land management agencies and the State for fire planning also creates lasting relationships that extend beyond the immediate task."). 139 Normally, information pooling and benchmarking of the sort must be done by a third-party. 143 Indeed, comparing some performance to other, similar performances is its own kind of normativity-something qualitatively different from setting general conduct standards in the abstract. The information collected (if not necessarily the cohort being benchmarked) is nonrivalrous 144 and inherently cumulative. Homebuyers would certainly value such comparative information. 145 Indeed, this form of regulation may be the only kind structured to spur continuous adaptation in the pursuit of complex goals.
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Just as importantly, though, if the normal justification for federal governance of natural resources is that the nation as a whole possesses authority over the resource and values it differently from its value in the default, we must not forget that the processes by which federal authority is mobilized allow interested parties unique opportunities to skew the product. 147 One need not share the cynicism of positive political theory to presume that distortions in the political process are real and potentially devastating. 148 Confining the federal role and the frequency at which federal law must change to keep pace is almost certainly an advantage over the long term. . 143 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 139, at 28 (noting the rise of "targeted transparency" as a distinct kind of disclosure policy that focuses on disclosures that are able to redress information asymmetries, extend the bounds of rationality, and not be prohibitively costly to generate). 144 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 139, at 31 ("New information has one of the central characterizes of a so-called public good: its consumption is non-rival, meaning that new information can be consumed by one party without diminishing its value to another party."). 145 See Colburn, Localism's Ecology, supra note 131, at 1000-11. 146 Most forms of rulemaking, even some of the most informal, are prone to rutting and ossification as compared to the adaptiveness needed in natural resources management. Pushing such information out widely would unquestionably be a public service. Indeed, this kind of federal role can propel public values into traditionally private contexts-creating hybrids that, "far from weakening democratic norms of due process, rationality, equality, and accountability, could instead extend these norms" 153 significantly. Yet our land management agencies so far seem 149 Probably the most prominent shortcoming of the WFLC itself is its total failure to assess wildfire risks comparatively. The IMPLEMENTATION PLAN'S fourth goal, promoting community assistance, includes what it labels an "outcome", that is: "[c]ommunities atrisk have increased capacity to prevent losses from wildland fire and realized economic benefits resulting from treatments and services." IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 44, at 19. But this outcome has only nominal measures assigned to it, i.e., whether a community has enacted any fire mitigation/prevention ordinance, not measures designed to assess community performances qualitatively. In other words, it ignores the incremental, pragmatic possibilities that benchmarking risk-prone communities against each other represents. 154 With few exceptions, they refuse to play a real role in guiding CWPP development or in prioritizing projects in particular regions. 155 If anything, thus, federal legislation reforming HFRA-or public lands law more generally-should direct the Forest Service and the Interior Department to better monitor, collect, and benchmark the work put into CWPPs with the federal carrots HFRA creates. More sunlight within the agencies themselves, though, is just as vital a step. Section B explains.
B. Improving Transparency from the Top Down
Our public lands agencies have always conceived of fire as their problem. They know that fire needs heat, oxygen, and fuel to burn and have decided that fuel is the only one they can control. 156 Much of the learning these agencies still have to do, thus, is more self-critical in nature. Fuels treatments are far less certain than the agencies' attitudes suggest. Indeed, stand-level treatments are richly complicated: without careful selection from the different techniques based on accurate information, one might actually just exacerbate the fire risks. 157 The appropriations train that HFRA got moving, 158 in short, might soon become the next gigantic mistake in good part because of agency structure and culture. If there is one thing these agencies learned over the last generation, it is how to minimize conflict with local communities and property owners-not how to reduce risk. 159 Now, to some, the fact that governance of the public lands is becoming just another appropriations logroll-just another farm bill-would be unsurprising. 160 The more opaque a political process, the less likely its agents will be accountable. But the actual prioritization of fuels treatment projects has gone so far underground that real accountability is becoming impossible, whatever model of politics one accepts. Of all Washington's processes, the budget process is its most opaque. 161 Yet that is where most of the hard decisions are being made on wildfire today. Before the federal government can credibly maintain that communities and regions owe each other better transparency about their fire planning in the wildland/urban interface, the government itself will have to be more explicit about its plans and priorities.
The Forest Service and the Department of Interior must make the budget process that annually channels billions of dollars in fuels treatment projects and fire restoration much more public than it is. At present, if there is any coherence to the priority of appropriations and project selection, it is submerged in oceans of patronage and politics-as-usual. Crooked or not, mere appearances can and do undermine public confidence in the governance of public lands. 162 
C. Planning for Unintended, Unforeseen Consequences
The fire risks we know today are largely the unintended consequences of a continental-scale land use policy-fire suppression. That particular policy, it bears mentioning, was a combination of expert advice and expedience. 163 Now mistakes are inevitable in land planning, even with the benefit of expertise. But incorrigible mistakes of immense scale are not inevitable. To be sure, climate change has made plain how expert advice that is inconvenient can be attacked and discounted. It is possible, though, to design institutions around such collective, cognitive biases. It is possible to take institutional design seriously and to build surprise and mistake into any policy planning operation. 164 The much harder question is whether our notions of law and legal process can square up with such institutions. 165 To imagine a "rolling rule regime" in which any single iteration of a norm is merely a further step in its continuous improvement 166 is not necessarily to imagine the world in which that regime includes the rule of law. Relatively steady, compartmentalized statements of means and ends are an underappreciated constant in our culture's dominant theories of law. But if our jurisprudential traditions continue migrating away from their focus on interpretation toward a more productive focus on deliberation, 167 truly adaptive management might become more than a theoretical possibility. There is hope that this migration will continue, but it is far from assured.
The administrative agency by itself is probably incapable of being an adaptive steward of land health over the long term. Bureaucracies do not sustain experimentation for one simple reason: routine is their oxygen. 168 But the other side of this coin is that the judiciary, an institution able to destabilize the status quo occasionally, has ineradicable limits of its own. "Public law problems invariably result from the complex interaction of conduct by myriad actors. It is highly unlikely that courts could ever command the evidence or methodology necessary to isolate the effects of particular unlawful decisions." 169 The time tested palliative is that they check and balance each other. Judging the performance to date, though, that is wide of the mark in this case.
I have argued here (and elsewhere) that the independent variable in this equation is scale. The CWPPs themselves illustrate. It turns out that the scale of the CWPPs being done today varies significantly. In some states, CWPPs are county-or region-wide, while in others each community has its own CWPP.
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Getting the requisite buy-in, of course, is the major determinant. 171 To be sure, any municipality or county that uses its land use controls for the benefit of its wider region is probably the exception. But there is one dynamic where this exception should become the norm: when localities must cooperate to oppose forces more threatening than their neighbors. And wildfire seems to be just such a threat. So if field office staff could gather information on local milestones, deliver that information quickly and to the right local constituencies, benchmark communities' performances to show who are the leaders and laggards, and even identify "rolling best partnerships" on broader scale issues like watersheds, then we could be hybridizing large and small scale land planning. The good news is 166 168 See Pritchard & Sanderson, supra note 164, at 166 ("Part of the puzzle of adaptive management is how to build a nonbureaucratic bureaucracy. Is it possible to have a legitimate, capable, and responsible management organization that is constantly reforming and reinventing itself, undergoing revolt?"). 169 Sabel & Simon, supra note 142, at 1085. 170 See CWPP STATUS REPORT, supra note 79, at 10. 171 Cf. CWPP STATUS REPORT, supra note 79, at 10 ("Getting signatures from all the fire chiefs in a single county can be a major challenge, especially when the county is large.").
that taboos against appeals to civic virtue slacken at such scales where community is still a powerful concept (or at least more powerful than it is in the "procedural republic"). 172 The bad news is that too many of our communities are still being built with little or no attention being paid to the collaborative, communicative dimensions of "community."
Truly restorative, adaptive land use policies will entail more than just planning (even multiscalar planning). It will entail creative partnering, perhaps with tools like bridge financing or other subsidies to distressed landowners, 173 restorative work that is labor intensive and of uncertain benefit, and, most especially, collectively derived definitions of desirable future conditions. 174 In my view, if we can do that, a more sustained deliberative dialogue about what makes a landscape "healthy" is possible. 175 It is certainly a more restorative project than just subsidizing more sprawl.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FIRE NEXT TIME
In his prescient 1963 book, The Fire Next Time, James Baldwin made a powerful, poetic argument that America as a collective enterprise has consisted too often in various self-perpetuating delusions. Baldwin's experiences growing up in Harlem in the 1930s and '40s forged his conviction that people, while not "terribly anxious to be equal (equal, after all, to what and to whom?)," do "love the idea of being superior." 176 Another such delusion, he argued, took the form of an 'American dream' that allowed us to lead unexamined lives-to, for example,
